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Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview of
Civilian and Military Characteristics
HON. ROBERT EMMET QUINN*
When General John D. Lavelle confessed to disobedience of or-
ders prohibiting certain air strikes in North Vietnam and to falsi-
fication of official records as to the raids, he was retired from the
Air Force, with less rank than he had while on active duty, but
with no loss of pay. Although one commentator on the case has
asked: "How on earth is any soldier to be held to orders if La-
velle goes free?",1 President Nixon described the "punishment" as
"fair." When Daniel Ellsberg allegedly disregarded the govern-
ment's "top secret" classification of the Pentagon Papers, he was
indicted on fifteen counts, including a charge that he conspired to
"defraud" the nation by obstructing a lawful government function.
Since the charges carry an aggregate punishment of 115 years, the
government will, presumably, in the event of conviction, urge, as
"fair," imposition of a long prison term. Reportedly, in random
street interviews many people have indicated that they "approve of
[Ellsberg's] . .. disclosure of the Pentagon Papers."2  To these
people, conviction and imprisonment of Ellsberg would undoubt-
* Judge, United States Court of Military Appeals.
1. Wills, Lavelle's Crimes Must be Punished, The Washington Post,
June 26, 1972, § A, at 21.
2. Ungar, United States v. Ellsberg, The Washington Post, July 9, 1972,§ B, at 5, col. 6.
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edly be "unfair." Both incidents have evoked heated argument
about morals and national honor. Among other points of dispute,
the different treatment accorded Lavelle and Ellsberg has provided
grist for the mill of controversy between political scientists and
lawyers, as to whether all litigation is "a form of political action."3
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the view that political con-
siderations and public, social and economic issues color every judi-
cial proceeding, military and civilian, or with the government's dis-
parate action toward General Lavelle and Civilian Ellsberg, an
understanding of the general scope and mechanics of prosecutorial
discretion may contribute to better understanding of the process,
if not the merits, of disposition of actual or suspected criminal
conduct in the military and civilian communities.
A comparison of systems necessarily involves a subjective judg-
ment in the selection of points of comparison. An outstanding
critic of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar
Hoover, for example, ascribed an empire-building complex to Mr.
Hoover because the Bureau was, in the critic's judgment, over-
staffed. On the other hand, pointing to the ever-increasing bur-
den of investigation imposed upon the Bureau, Professors Harry
and Bonaro Overstreet have judged the Bureau's staff to be "very
close to the line beyond which it would be intolerably too small."4
The selectivity of one observer of military criminal law and its
administration can be perceived in the title of his book, Military
Justice Is to Justice as Military Music Is to Music.5 Oppositely,
after years of service on the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals, the civilian "Supreme Court" of the courts-martial system,
the author perceived the "explosion of constitutional doctrine" in
the civilian criminal courts during the period of the Warren Court
as bringing the civilian practice "more in line with that in effect in
the military system" and as a "catching up" of the civilian com-
munity with the military in the "effective guarantee of constitu-
tional rights."6  Subjective distillation of qualities can make corn-
3. Hakman, Political Trials in the Legal Order: A Political Scientist's
Perspective, 21 J. PuB. L. 73 (1972).
4. H. & B. OvEmsmTnR, THE FBI IN OuR Orsx Socmnry 102 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as OVEtsTREET].
5. SHERMILL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE AS MI=YARY MusIC IS TO
Music (1970).
6. Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Prac-
tice, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1240, 1242 (1968).
parable the incomparable; even chalk and cheese can be suitably
compared if one refers to the chalk-like texture of the cheese or
to its chalky color. One who writes from the vantage point of
participation is expected to "tell it like it is," but the expectation
may fall short in the performance, because of the human tendency
to pronounce the product of one's own work good, without actually
seeing, and, in the seeing, judging that it is good. Years ago, I
recorded my judgment that the courts-martial system under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice has made an irreversible turn-
about from the "drumhead" and "can truly be regarded as an in-
tegral part" of the regular judicial system.7 The present broad-
brush comparison of prosecutorial discretion in the civilian and
military criminal justice systems is a reaffirmation of that judg-
ment.
AiBSOLUTION FROM CRUVIE
MyLai, an obscure hamlet in the Republic of South Vietnam,
and Lieutenant William L. Calley, an obscure junior officer of the
United States Army in South Vietnam, conjoined in an incident
that has called into question the American posture in Vietnam in
general, and, in particular, whether, as William F. Buckley, Jr., has
put it, "the American military has become so calloused and cruel
and irresponsible" as to make MyLai occurrences "altogether work-
day phenomena." s Lieutenant Calley was convicted by an army
general court-martial of the premeditated murder of twenty-two
civilians. Following the conviction, at President Nixon's personal
direction, Calley was removed from the stockade, where he had
been confined by the military commander, to a personal apartment
on post. The military prosecutor called the President's act an "in-
tervention [that] has . . . damaged the military judicial system"
and exposed it to the "criticism that it is subject to political in-
fluence. . . [contrary to the] fundamental precept of our judicial
system that the legal processes of this country must be kept free
from any outside influences." 9 Assuredly, the President's action
was an "intervention" and an "outside influence," but was it, as
the prosecutor implied, unlawful, either in civilian or military
law? The President's probable motives are not determinative of
his constitutional and statutory power to intercede in regard to an
offense against the United States.
7. Id. at 1258.
8. 117 CONG. REC. 10148 (1971) (Article by William F. Buckley, Jr.,
Observations on Calley Reaction).
9. 117 CONG. REC. 10148 (1971) (Letter from Capt. Aubrey M. Daniel
III to the President of the United States).
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Article II, § 2 of the United States Constitution vests in the
President the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offenses
against the United States except in Cases of Impeachment." Com-
monly, pardon is thought of as an act of absolution of the legal dis-
abilities consequent upon conviction. 10 Lieutenant Calley's prose-
cutor implied that presidential intercession in any criminal pro-
ceeding in advance of conviction is wrongful. From that stand-
point, the Administration's refusal to investigate a suspected crim-
inal act can be described, as it was described by Life magazine, in
a recent article, as "tampering with justice."'" However, the scope
of the constitutional power to pardon is not so limited.
The pardon power does not require a conviction to make it op-
erative. It has vitality at all times. It can be used to bar investi-
gation of suspected criminal conduct, and it can be used to bar
prosecution of a known crime. As early as 1807, President Jeffer-
son granted a pardon to a witness before a grand jury inquiring
into the allegation of treason against Aaron Burr.12 In modern
practice, an executive grant of freedom from prosecution for crim-
inal conduct to obtain testimony is not considered a pardon, but a
grant of immunity, and the source of the grant is not the constitu-
tional power of pardon but a statute by Congress. However, other
means by which the executive department can bar prosecution for
federal offenses, such as refusal to sign an indictment by the grand
jury,13 or abandoning prosecution of a signed indictment,14 are still
expressly related to the general pardon power. The fact that cur-
rently a statute confers prosecutorial discretion to United States
Attorneys to grant immunity to witnesses 5 does not dilute the
President's pardon power. Although a divided United States Su-
preme Court upheld immunity grants by Congress as not infring-
10. In Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1191 (1st Cir. 1970), the
Court held that the Commissioner of the Boston Police Department could,
"as a matter of policy, refuse to appoint [to the police force] all whose
pardons were granted for grounds other than innocence."
11. Investigative Report: Tampering with Justice in San Diego, LuE,
March 24, 1972, at 28.
12. See United States v. Kirsch, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 90 n.4, 35 C.M.R. 56,
62 n.4 (1964).
13. In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970).
14. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1967).
15. Immunity Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1970); Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
ing upon the President's power,'0 recognition of the legislative au-
thority does not diminish the executive power.17
Anticipated public reaction, partisan political considerations, or
even the dictates of American relations with foreign powers can,
of course, deter the President from exercising the pardon power,
in whole or in part. It is most unlikely, for example, that any
President serving in the next decade would, without Congressional
support, or overwhelming public support, grant amnesty to dodg-
ers of the draft or deserters from the armed forces during the pe-
riod of direct American participation in the land war in Vietnam.
The influence of these practical considerations does not delimit the
President's legal authority. Whether a vocal or silent majority or
minority approved President Nixon's intervention on behalf of
Lieutenant Calley may be debatable; but that the President pos-
sessed the constitutional power to intercede is undeniable.
Conception of a court-martial as an instrument of command
might support a conclusion that misconduct in the military is not
an "offense against the United States" within the meaning of the
pardon power. Whatever its theoretical underpinning, the con-
ception has been so eroded by the application of constitutional
principles to the military justice system as to eliminate it from
serious consideration as a restriction on the pardon power in re-
spect to offenses triable by courts-martial.' s The Court of Military
Appeals has held that a court-martial is a criminal proceeding in
the same sense as a prosecution for a federal crime in the United
States District Court.' 9 The President has also asserted authority
to pardon for innocence a Marine Master Sergeant convicted by
general court-martial of stealing government property.20 Prece-
dents of principle and practice, therefore, leave no doubt that an
offense properly triable by court-martial is subject to the pardon
power of the President, without considering the power he may
have as constitutionally designated Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces.
As to a given case, it is an exceedingly remote possibility that
the President would know of it or be inclined, on his own initiative
16. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
17. For an interesting speculation as to how the executive power to re-
frain from prosecution can be used to obtain the vote of a member of
Congress on legislation proposed by the executive see Justice White's opin-
ion in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
18. Quinn, Courts-Martial Practice: A View from the Top, 22 HAsT7NGs
L. J. 201, 202 (1971).
19. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 34, 35 C.M.R. 3, 6 (1964).
See also United States v. Moore, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 635, 34 C.M.R. 415 (1964).
20. 111 CoNr. REc. 23557 (1965).
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to intercede in it. The practical business of deciding what crimes
should be investigated or prosecuted is largely for the Attorney
General and his subordinates as the President's "surrogates."2'
For certain crimes, Congress has conferred independent authority
upon the United States Attorney in the several judicial districts to
exercise prosecutorial discretion without the direct imprimatur of
the President, but the grant is hedged with the condition that ap-
proval of the Attorney General be first obtained.22 For all practi-
cal purposes, therefore, the President controls prosecutorial discre-
tion for all federal crimes, military as well as civilian. Theoreti-
cally, his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed ' 23
obligates him and his surrogates to investigate and prosecute every
crime. In reality, practical considerations substantially qualify the
obligation.
CmcumsTAxcEs AFFEcTG PROSEcuTonxAI DiscRsxON
An obvious circumstance that can force forebearance of investi-
gation and prosecution is inadequacy of funds. In the period be-
fore creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Congress pro-
vided little funds for investigation of most crimes. In his annual
report for fiscal 1905, Attorney General Moody reported that he
was constrained to allow "to flourish" the evil of noninvestigation
of all but the most conspicuous frauds because of insufficient mon-
ey.2 4 Presently, in terms of total Federal expenditure, Congress
may be generous in its appropriations for prosecution of crime, but
the enlarged burden of federal law, from enforcement of civil rights
to enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act, makes it virtually
impossible to investigate every instance of suspected crime.
Less obvious, and certainly less known and understood, is the
necessity for adapting prosecution to national security needs.
Charges against anti-war activist Leslie Bacon arising out of in-
vestigation of the March 1, 1971, bombing of the Capitol were re-
cently dropped because the Justice Department concluded that it
could not reply to a defense motion "for disclosure of electronic
21. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967).
22. Immunity Act, 18 USC § 3486 (1970); Ullman v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956).
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
24. 1905 ATT'Y GEru. AmN. REP. 16, cited in OvmsnET, supra note 4,
at 17.
surveillance. ' 25  Since Justice Douglas granted an order staying
Ellsberg's trial until appellate determination of a ruling refusing
the defense access to government tapes of "foreign intelligence"
wiretaps and the Supreme Court voted not to convene in special
session to consider Justice Douglas' order, there are indications that
the government might be "unwilling to compromise the confiden-
tiality of the surveillance" and, may, therefore, drop the prosecu-
tion.26
Better known, but viewed differently by lawyers and laymen,
is the prosecutorial discretion implicit in "plea bargaining." Apart
from the obvious advantage of saving time and money, it may also
make good sense not to proceed to conviction on all counts of a
multiple count indictment, if the defendant stands ready to plead
guilty to one or more of the counts, particularly if all the counts
arise from the same transaction. It may often make good sense
not to push for conviction on a charge as alleged, and hope for the
"pound of flesh" if there are substantial issues of fact as to that
charge and the defendant stands ready to plead guilty to a signifi-
cant lesser offense included within the charge. Conceding both
the economic benefits and the good sense in each of the instances
cited, the particular exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be un-
just, if "justice" is conceived of as that which accords with the
conscience and traditions of society, with what is "fair."27  The
justice of a bargained plea may not be synonymous with its legal-
ity. As noted previously, the President possesses constitutional
authority to absolve a wrongdoer from the consequences of his act
in every case except impeachment, but the public's conscience can
deter him from its exercise irrespective of his own innermost feel-
ings. Conversely, the President's conscience might decree the jus-
tice of exacting the full penalty of law for a particular crime, but
public opinion might impel him to pardon. In the McCarthy era,
many people in different strata of the American and international
communities favored a partial presidential pardon for convicted
spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, in the form of changing the
death sentence imposed upon them to life imprisonment. Acknowl-
edging the "grave concern ... of serious people," President Eisen-
hower concluded that the Rosenbergs' crime had "immeasurably
25. The Washington Post, August 5, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 5, and § A, at
13, col. 2.
26. The Washington Post, August 6, 1972, § A, at 8, col. 1.
27. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 519 (1937). Although the Palko
decision was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Jus-
tice Cardozo's discussion of the nature of "due process" still provides a
"rationalizing principle" for the concept of justice.
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increas[ed] the chances of atomic war" and thereby "may have
condemned to death tens of millions of innocent people all over
the world;" accordingly, he refused to intervene.28 The President's
statement left the impression that his refusal was more influenced
by his own conscience than by reasoned reflection on the con-
science of those who urged him to exercise his discretion. On the
other hand, Lieutenant Calley's prosecutor speculated that since
President Nixon had earlier described Calley's conduct at MyLai
as "certainly a massacre," his mitigative intervention in the case,
while it was still in progress, could "only have been prompted by
the response of a vocal segment of our population. '29
The "justice" of the particular exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion involved in plea bargaining is almost impossible to measure.
At least in large urban areas, the primary consideration may have
little relevance to the concept of fairness. The President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice com-
mented on this circumstance in its report, The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society. While conceding that the degree of discretion in
a given case of plea bargaining might be the result of the prose-
cutor's conviction that his action was just, the Commission per-
ceived that his decision could as readily have been dictated simply
by "the fact that there may be in the system at any one time ten
times as many cases as there are prosecutors or judges or court
rooms to handle them, should everyone come to trial. '30 Law-
yers may view the result of this kind of justice with equanimity,
but experience indicates that laymen have difficulty in reconciling
plea bargaining in particular cases with the ideal of "Equal Justice
Under Law." It is almost impossible to explain to a layman that
prosecutorial discretion justified the conviction of one accused of
a felony and his confinement for several years because he was
convicted after a trial, while a participant in the same crime is
sentenced to confinement for months under a bargained plea to a
misdemeanor.
28. Statement by the President Declining to Intervene on Behalf of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, PUBLIC PAPRs OF T M PESIErS, DWIGHT D.
EmssmowER (1953), No. 114, June 19, 1953, at 447. See also Statement by
the President After Reviewing the Case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
Id. No. 10, February 11, 1953, at 40.
29. See note 9 supra.
30. PRESIDENT'S Co1VAI'N ON LAW ENFORcEmENT AND ADMINISTRATION
oF JUsTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRnvIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 11 (1967).
The attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace of Ala-
bama after he had made a speech in the Democratic Party Presi-
dential primary in Maryland on May 15, 1972, provides an exam-
ple of a third material influence for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, specifically, conviction and sentence of the accused in
another jurisdiction or court. Arthur Herman Bremer was con-
victed by a Maryland Circuit Court of a number of offenses arising
out of the shooting and was sentenced to consecutive terms of im-
prisoniment for several of the major offenses for a total of 63
years.31 Thus, the federal prosecutor is confronted with the practi-
cal utility or desirability of federal prosecution of Bremer for fed-
eral offenses committed in the same shooting.
All of the mentioned circumstances apply to prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the military criminal justice system as they apply to
the civilian system. But, the prosecuting attorney of the military
system, called the trial counsel, possesses none of the power of the
civilian prosecutor. He cannot determine the nature or degree of
the crime with which to charge the wrongdoer; he cannot drop
a charge or reduce the severity of a charge in a bargain for a plea
of guilty; he cannot refuse to proceed with a formal charge be-
cause he is convinced that the interests of the government will be
better served than by conviction of the wrongdoer. All these
powers and more, to the point of almost reaching the limits of the
President's power to pardon, are vested in a "commanding officer"
authorized to convene a court-martial.32
At least since the reforms of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice in 1950, the major focus on the commanding officer's functions
in regard to court-martial has been on his role as a "judicial offi-
cer."33 In many respects the commander retained traditional func-
tions of executive authority. The "transcendental nature" of his
power "to exonerate from punishment" was considered by the
Court of Military Review in United States v. Kirsch34 Since only
an overview of prosecutorial discretion is offered here, the follow-
31. The Washington Post, August 5, 1972, at 1.
32. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as
UCMJJ, the commander of a specified military organization such as an
army group, naval station, or air division may convene a court-martial.
UCMJ arts. 22(7), 23(7), 24(4), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822, 823, 824 (1970). Others
may be designated by the President or the Secretary of the commander's
armed force. UCMJ arts. 22(7), 23(7), 24(4), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822, 823, 824
(1970).
33. Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander, 41 Mm. L. REv. 1(1968) [hereinafter cited as Hansen]
34. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964).
[VOL. 10: 36, 1972] Prosecutorial Discretion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ing excerpt from the principal opinion in Kirsch will serve to de-
fine the general dimensions of the commander's authority:
At any stage of the trial he can order the charges withdrawn,
and the trial discontinued. Article 44 of the Uniform Code,
10 USC § 844, indicates Congress anticipated a convening authority
could, and as the occasion warranted would, withdraw charges
after they had been referred to trial. Congress placed no limita-
tion whatever on the exercise of this power. Yet, at the same
time it provided, in conformity with the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy, that withdrawal of a charge after the
introduction of evidence results in the attachment of jeopardy,
and thereafter the accused is as fully protected against prosecution
as though he had been previously tried and acquitted. Article
44, Code, supra; United States v Johnpier, 12 USCMA 90, 30 CIVtR
90; United States v Stringer, 5 USCMA 122, 17 CMR 122.
What is the significance of this broad spectrum of power?
What name can be given to this aggregate of authority that in-
cludes the right to discontinue an investigation into whether a
crime has been committed; to dismiss any formal charge that may
be made; to direct that a charge previously referred to trial be
withdrawn; and, finally, to set aside a determination of guilt by
the triers of the facts and the adjudged sentence, and order that
the charge be dismissed and the accused be free of any and all
punishment prescribed by law for the offenses he committed?
What more is embraced in the power of pardon? Combined, the
provisions of the Uniform Code confer upon courts-martial author-
ity the power to create an absolute legal bar to prosecution of a
person subject to the Code and to his command for any offense
in violation of the Code.3 5
APPLICATION OF DISCRETION
As noted above, to a degree, prosecutorial discretion in the ci-
vilian community may be influenced by circumstances unrelated
to a sense of justice. Similarly, influences unconnected with any
concept of justice may prod the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
on the part of a military commander. Combat conditions, for ex-
ample, may induce him to "empty the whole guardhouse" of ac-
cused awaiting trial and those serving adjudged confinement.36
For the usual case, however, military law has attempted to impart
an objective standard which has no parallel in civilian law. The
Manual for Courts-Martial, which defines the rules of procedure
for the military justice system,37 reminds the commander con-
35. Id. at 92, 35 C.M.R. at 64.
36. Comment by General Collins quoted in Hansen, supra note 33, at 49.
37. See UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 and Exec. Order No. 11476, 3 C.F.R.
802 (1966-70 Comp.).
fronted with a suspected or known offense, that one of the "basic
considerations" in determining whether to prosecute, or on what
terms to prosecute, is that his disposition must serve both "the in-
terests of justice and discipline. 3 8 Arguably, a civilian prosecutor
would not refrain from prosecution of a known offense or agree
to reduction of a charged offense to a less serious crime without
first considering the fairness of his action in regard to both the
defendant and the community. One can concede the argument but
still be left with an intuitive conviction that, in this area, as in the
field of legal and judicial ethics, the existence of a formally pro-
mulgated standard for conduct is a powerful inducement to reason,
before acting, about the facts and the alternatives to achieve the
best balance of the interests and needs of the community with the
interests and needs of the individual offender. This intuitive con-
viction is reinforced by consideration of the kinds of information
routinely available to the military commander about the offender,
the victim, and the community that are not normally available to
the civilian prosecutor in other than rural areas and small towns.
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement con-
cluded from its interviews and conferences that "prosecutors ...
seldom know anything at all about a defendant's background, char-
acter, or way of life, either at first hand or by hearsay," and "may
often have no way of judging how the defendant fits into his own
society or culture;" as a result, his judgment on the amount and
kind of discretion to exercise in a case may be the product only of
his personal bias and speculation. 9 There is no evidence that
these conditions have materially changed. In contrast, the mili-
tary commander has available to him and is bound not only to
"collect and examine all evidence that is essential to a determina-
tion" of guilt but to consider as well "evidence in mitigation or
extenuation." 40  He will have a record and specially-prepared in-
formation as to previous punishment of the accused, if any, his
performance of military duty, his general character, and personal
circumstances, such as marital status and other relationships. Em-
pirically, knowledge of matters of crucial importance to a standard
of measurement usually assures a greater degree of probability of
adherence to that standard; it can, therefore, be fairly concluded
that the military commander's choice of a prosecutorial alternative
in a particular case is more likely to comport with justice, than
the alternative selected by the civilian prosecutor.
38. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, para. 30i (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MCM, 1969].
39. Tm CHALLENGE OF CM2 E IN A FREs SocIEY, supra note 30, at 127.
40. MCM, 1969, para. 32b.
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Complementing the likelihood that a greater quantity of perti-
nent information will be available to the military commander than
to the civilian prosecutor, is the commander's wider range of al-
ternatives between doing nothing about the alleged crime and
prosecuting for its most serious aspect.
Both the civilian prosecutor and the military commander can
charge an accused with less than the most serious aspect of his
crime. Illustratively, in a homicide, they may choose to proceed
on a charge of unpremeditated murder or even voluntary man-
slaughter, although evidence may be at hand to justify a jury's
consideration of premeditated murder; or they may elect to accept
a plea of guilty to larceny, despite availability of evidence to es-
tablish the wrong as robbery. Alternatives of this kind exhaust
the civilian prosecutor's range of discretion; they do not so delimit
the military commander's.
Prosecutorial Discretion in a Capital Case
Aside from the limitations of the recent Supreme Court decision
as to the constitutionality of a death sentence,41 if the civilian
prosecutor concludes that a premeditated murder charge is the
only conscionable charge, but that a death sentence would be un-
just, he can choose only between compromising the charge to un-
premeditated murder or prosecuting the premeditated murder
charge, with a recommendation for a lesser sentence than death, in
the event of conviction. Acceptance by the judge of the sentence
recommendation of the prosecutor may be, as reported by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement, largely perfunc-
tory,42 but it is doubtful that the practice obtains in death cases;
it is certainly inapplicable in cases in which the decision as to
death must be made by the jury.48 However, the military com-
mander can prevent imposition of a death sentence in a capital
case. He has specific authority to refer every charge carrying the
death penalty, but one (spying in time of war), to trial with in-
structions that it be treated as a noncapital offense.
44
41. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
42. THE CHALLENGE OP CIME IN A Fa SocIETY, supra note 30, at 11.
43. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
44. See UCMJ arts. 49f, 106, 10 U.S.C. §§ 849, 906 (1970); MCM, 1969,
para. 33j.
Discretion in Noncapital Cases
Civilian jurisdictions frequently have different courts for the
trial of different kinds of criminal conduct. The differentiation
may be predicated upon the nature of the offense, as a felony or
misdemeanor, or it may be based on the status of the offender, as
a juvenile or an adult. By reducing a felony charge to a misde-
meanor, the civilian prosecutor can effect a change in the court
that will try the charge. In the same way, he can affect the legal
penalties and the social stigma incident to conviction. But, if no
change in the nature of the charge is made, the only way the ci-
vilian prosecutor can effectuate his conception of a just limitation
on punishment in the event of conviction is to recommend that
limit to the trial judge. Again, if the offender is within the statu-
tory age for juveniles, and the offense is one which can be waived
from the juvenile court to the regular criminal court for trial as
an adult, the prosecutor or the intake officer of the juvenile court
can only recommend that the case be transferred. In similar situ-
ations the military commander can act on his own.
Military law makes no distinction in the prosecution for crime
on the basis of age so there are no juvenile delinquents or youthful
offenders as such.45 Age, however, may be considered in assess-
ment of the sentence. With few exceptions, the military com-
mander can, without reducing the severity of the charge, refer the
case to one of the three courts comprising the courts-martial sys-
tem, the general court-martial, the special court-martial, and the
summary court-martial.46 The choice of court also determines the
maximum punishment to which the accused is subject. A general
court-martial can impose a sentence to the maximum authorized
for the offense, which can extend to a dishonorable discharge and
death. However, regardless of the legal maximum for the offense,
a special court-martial cannot adjudge confinement in excess of
six months, and a summary court-martial cannot impose confine-
ment in excess of one month.47 The flexibility this system allows
45. United States v. Baker, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 311, 312, 34 C.M.R. 91, 92
(1963). In the civilian community, the accident of age can produce bizarre
results. In one case of notoriety in the District of Columbia, three persons
robbed a bank and killed a police officer in their escape. After appre-
hension and indictment for premeditated murder and other charges, one
of the three pleaded guilty; just under 22 years of age she was sentenced as
a youthful offender, which meant a maximum imprisonment for 9 years
and possible parole within 9 months. One of the other defendants wasjust over 22. He and the third of the trio were convicted as charged and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Washington Post, March 17, 1972.
46. See MCM, 1969, paras. 14, 15, 16.
47. UCMJ arts. 19, 20, 10 U.S.C. § 819, 820 (1970).
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strengthens the potential for justice, not only in the individual
case but in regard to particular offenses. The latter circumstance
is dramatically illustrated by the military experience with drug
use in Vietnam.
Wrongful use of marihuana is punishable in the military by dis-
honorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and con-
finement at hard labor for five years.48 It is, therefore, an offense
equivalent to a felony in the civilian community. In the first years
of the conflict, marihuana users were almost always tried by gen-
eral court-martial and sentenced to a dishonorable dicharge and a
substantial period of confinement. As the military learned more
about the nature of marihuana and its use by military personnel
in the special conditions obtaining in Vietnam, it became generally
recognized that trial by general court-martial was inappropriately
severe. A similar situation developed in the civilian community
in the United States. Where the civilian prosecutor had to await
legislation to reduce the severity of the offense, the military com-
mander was able to respond expeditiously to the changed situation
by referring a use case to a special court-martial for trial.
Nonjudicial Punishment
While the volume of serious crime is ever-increasing, the great
bulk of offenses dealt with in the criminal justice system, civilian
and military, are of a routine and minor nature, such as disorders
of various kinds. 9 The civilian prosecutor who believes that some
kind of punishment is essential for rehabilitation of the accused
has no choice but to submit the offense to trial. A significantly
different choice is open to the military commander. He can resort
to a form of disciplinary punishment as a substitute for the crim-
inal proceedings of courts-martial.
Authorized by Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, the commander can impose a variety of punishments for "mi-
nor offenses." The Code does not define the nature of a minor of-
fense, but the Manual for Courts-Martial describes it as not includ-
ing misconduct "of a kind which, if tried by general court-martial,
could be punished by dishonorable discharge or confinement for
48. MCM, 1969, para. 127c, Table of Maximum Punishments.
49. THE CHALLENGE OF CFIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 126.
more than a year."50 However, the Manual's description is not
rigid, and it contemplates consideration of "the circumstances sur-
rounding" the commission of the offense, as well as the nature of
the offense and its authorized maximum punishment. Moreover,
the Manual encourages recourse to Article 15, instead of courts-
martial.51 In the event of conviction by court-martial for a later
offense, Article 15 punishment is not, as a previous conviction by
court-martial is, a basis for an increase in the maximum punish-
ment for the later offense.52 Another special feature of such pun-
ishment is that, unlike the practice in most civilian jurisdictions
which preserves for all time even the record of arrest for the most
minor offense, the official record is preserved for only a limited
period of time, and with certain exceptions, is expunged from the
individual's service record when he is transferred to another unit.53
CONCLUSION
As is true of any power, its exercise can be abused. More often,
depending upon the perspective of the viewer, it may only appear
to be abused. Reportedly, Daniel Ellsberg's attorneys believe that
the Administration's efforts to complete the Ellsberg trial before
the presidential election is politically motivated. Some critics of
the Air Force's action in General Lavelle's case apparently believe
that its failure to prosecute the general is an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion. Abuse, real or imagined, is, however, the unusual. In
the main, prosecutorial discretion is an extremely valuable means
of achieving a just balance in the quadruple objectives of the crim-
inal justice system: (1). effective punishment for the individual;
(2). removal of dangerous persons from the community; (3). trans-
formance of the law-breaker into the law-abiding; and (4). deter-
rence of others from crime. To the extent that military law allows
a broader range of prosecutorial discretion than is permitted by
civilian law to the civilian prosecutor, the military justice system
has a greater capability for providing justice in a particular case.
50. MCM, 1969, para. 128b.
51. Id., para. 129. Except aboard a vessel, the accused has the right to
refuse nonjudicial punishment and to demand, in lieu thereof, trial by
court-martial. Id., para. 132.
52. Id., para. 127c, § B.
53. United States v. Cohan, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 469, 43 C.M.R. 309 (1971).
54. The Washington Post, August 6, 1972, § A, at 1.
